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S U M M A R Y
Background: Seasonal inﬂuenza causes annual epidemics by the accumulation of antigenic changes.
Pandemic inﬂuenza occurs through a major antigenic change of the inﬂuenza A virus, which can
originate from other hosts. Although new antigenic variants of the inﬂuenza A virus replace formerly
circulating seasonal and pandemic viruses, replacement mechanisms remain poorly understood.
Methods: A stochastic individual-based SEIR (susceptible–exposed–infectious–recovered) model with
two viral strains (formerly circulating old strain and newly emerged strain) was developed for
simulations to elucidate the replacement mechanisms.
Results: Factors and conditions of virus and host populations affecting the replacement were identiﬁed.
Replacement is more likely to occur in tropical regions than temperate regions. The magnitude of the
ongoing epidemic by the old strain, herd immunity against the old strain, and timing of appearance of the
new strain are not that important for replacement. It is probable that the frequency of replacement by a
pandemic virus is higher than a seasonal virus because of the high initial susceptibility and high basic
reproductive number of the pandemic virus.
Conclusions: The ﬁndings of this study on replacement mechanisms could lead to a better understanding
of virus transmission dynamics and may possibly be helpful in establishing an effective strategy to
mitigate the impact of seasonal and pandemic inﬂuenza.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Infectious diseases are still of great concern for public health,
particularly emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases such as
pandemic inﬂuenza. Globalization has also increased the risk of the
worldwide spread of infectious diseases. For example, after the
2009 detection of human infections with the novel swine-origin
inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus in North America, the virus spread
worldwide within a few weeks and resulted in a pandemic.1–3
Pandemic inﬂuenza occurs through a major antigenic change
(antigenic shift) of the inﬂuenza A virus, which can originate from
other hosts, such as birds and swine.4 Historically, pandemic
inﬂuenza has replaced the previously circulating seasonal inﬂuen-
za virus.5,6 In 1918, a novel H1N1 virus emerged (Spanish ﬂu) that
expelled the H3N8 virus that had been circulating among humans
since the late 19th century. Similarly, a novel H2N2 virus (Asian ﬂu)
expelled the H1N1 virus in 1957, and a novel H3N2 virus (Hong* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: furusey.tohoku@gmail.com (Y. Furuse).
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Kong ﬂu) expelled the H2N2 virus in 1968. However, the H1N1
virus, which re-emerged in 1977 (Russian ﬂu), did not expel the
H3N2 virus, and both H1N1 and H3N2 have been co-circulating
since 1977.7,8 The swine-origin H1N1 virus emerged and led to a
pandemic in 2009. This virus was closely related to the virus that
caused Spanish ﬂu in 1918,9 and some people, particularly the
elderly, had some immunity to it.10,11 After the emergence of the
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, the H3N2 virus (progeny of Hong Kong ﬂu)
did not disappear, whereas the former H1N1 virus disappeared;
since then, both H1N1 and H3N2 viruses have continued to co-
circulate in the human population.12,13 The next inﬂuenza
pandemic is an imminent threat to human health. Sporadic human
infections with avian inﬂuenza viruses, such as H5N1 and H7N9,
continue to occur, and these avian inﬂuenza viruses have the
potential to cause a pandemic once they acquire the ability to
efﬁciently transmit between humans.14,15
Seasonal inﬂuenza causes annual epidemics by the accumula-
tion of antigenic changes (antigenic drift), which allows viruses to
evade herd immunity.4,16 It has been proposed that a new
antigenic variant, generated by antigenic drift, ﬁrst evolved in
Southeast Asia and then spread to other parts of the world,ociety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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similar inﬂuenza viruses can cause global epidemics at almost the
same time.16,19 The inﬂuenza A virus epidemic shows a clear
winter peak in temperate regions and year-round circulation with
minor peaks in tropical regions.20–22 Patterson Ross et al. showed
that no strains persisted over the inﬂuenza season in temperate
regions.23 They suggested that an epidemic in temperate regions
was caused by a strain imported from other areas, rather than
strains lingering locally. Yet, little is known about the mechanisms
through which a previously circulating strain is replaced by a new
antigenic variant in temperate and tropical regions.
A mathematical model, speciﬁcally the compartment SIR
(susceptible–infectious–recovered) model, is used widely to
investigate the transmission dynamics of the inﬂuenza A virus.
A simple compartment model has been used successfully to predict
the behaviour of epidemics, which is consistent with that observed
in ‘real’ epidemics.24 In the compartment model, individuals in the
population are assigned to different subgroups or compartments,
each representing a speciﬁc stage of infection. The advancement of
the compartment model can tell us the future of an ongoing
pandemic,1 effective control measures against a potential pan-
demic,25 and the global dynamics of the virus.26
Although studies have shown that the host’s immunity plays an
important role in virus replacement by antigenic shift or drift,27,28
we still have a limited understanding of the mechanisms of theE1
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Figure 1. Simulation model. (A) Schematic diagram of the compartment model used in t
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model’ and ‘non-seasonality model’ are shown; months are grouped as depicted.replacement. Such information would lead to a better understand-
ing of virus transmission dynamics. It could also possibly be helpful
for establishing an effective avoidance strategy, such as vaccination
and social distancing measures, to mitigate the impacts of seasonal
and pandemic inﬂuenza. In this study, the compartment model was
used to elucidate how a newly emerged inﬂuenza A virus (antigenic
variant of seasonal inﬂuenza virus or pandemic inﬂuenza virus) is
capable of replacing the currently circulating inﬂuenza A virus.
2. Methods
A stochastic individual-based SEIR (susceptible–exposed–infec-
tious–recovered) model was developed for simulations (Figure 1A).
In a population of N, say that S are susceptible, E are exposed, I are
infectious, and R are recovered. I makes effective contact to transmit
the infection during an infectious period randomly in the
homogeneous mixing population. When effective contact occurs
between I and S or R, one (S or R) has a probability, p, of becoming
either E (p) or R (1  p). An effective contact number (c) is generated
for each I by Poisson distribution (R0); R0 is a basic reproductive
number. In addition, R0 at time t (day) can oscillate as seasonality. R0
can also be a constant for the ‘non-seasonality model’ representing
the year-round circulation of the virus in the tropics (Figure 1B).
An emerged strain (strain 2) appears in the model population at
random. The intensity of the cross-immunity response is expressedth (δ) death (μ)
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(p2) for R1spe is described by the following equation:
p2 ¼ 1ð1p1Þ’
and vice versa for p1. For details of the simulation modelling,
please see the Supplementary Material. Parameters and refer-
ences used for the simulation are also listed in the Supplementary
Material. The Student t-test, Pearson’s Chi-square test, Jonc-
kheere’s trend test, and the Mantel–Haenszel test were performed
using SPSS version 18 software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). A p-
value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically signiﬁcant.
3. Results
3.1. Simulation with the SEIR model
A stochastic individual-based SEIR simulation model was
developed with two different strains of inﬂuenza A virus
(Figure 1A). In the simulation, R0 (basic reproductive number)
was set differently for the ‘seasonality model’ (oscillation) and
‘non-seasonality model’ (constant; Figure 1B). The results of the
simulations with a single strain are shown in Figure 2. The
epidemic curves show a clear single peak for the ‘seasonality
model’ (simulating the temperate region) and a year-round
circulation with occasional peak(s) for the ‘non-seasonality model’
(simulating the tropical region). The annual infection rate in the
simulation was 14.9% (interquartile range 10.0–19.3%) for the0 100 200 300 400 500
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Figure 2. Simulation results with a single strain. (A) Epidemic curve (number of I) of 20 
epidemic curve of 50 simulations. (C) Infection rates of the epidemic. Horizontal lines an
two-tailed Student t-test. n.s., not signiﬁcant (p > 0.05).‘seasonality model’ (Figure 2C), which is compatible with many
studies estimating the inﬂuenza infection rate by serological
test.29–31 Although there are limited studies on the epidemiology
of inﬂuenza in the tropics, it is estimated that the disease burden of
inﬂuenza is as signiﬁcant as in temperate regions.20,32 The
simulations yielded an annual infection rate of 15.3% (interquartile
range 12.8–17.4%) for the ‘non-seasonality model’.
3.2. Replacement of seasonal inﬂuenza viruses
A model was then constructed with two strains to simulate the
introduction of an emerged antigenic variant (strain 2) during the
circulation of an existing strain (strain 1). It was simulated that
the antigenic variant appeared in the population at random during
the epidemic of an existing strain (see Methods for details). People
who are currently infectious by infection with strain 1 are
described as I1, and people who have immunity against strain
1 after recovery from the infection are described as R1. The same
applies to strain 2; I2 and R2. The intensity of cross-immunity
between the two strains is described by w. Brieﬂy, when w is 0, the
emerged strain is completely different antigenically from the
existing strain. When w is 1, the emerged strain is antigenically
the same as the existing strain. Epidemiological parameters of the
emerged strain were set to be same as the existing strain to
simulate an epidemic by antigenic drift (Supplementary Materi-
al). Since the pre-immunity level (1  ppst; probability of escape
from infection after exposure to the virus) for seasonal inﬂuenza0 100 200 300 400 500
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representative simulations (one colour represents one simulation). (B) Mean of the
d boxes show median and interquartile ranges. p-Values were calculated using the
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tested at 0.3 or above (Supplementary Material). ‘Replacement’
was deﬁned by three criteria as follows: (1) surpassing (‘number of
I2 is ﬁve or more per 10 000 per capita’ and ‘proportion of I2 is 80%
or more of the total number of I1 and I2’), (2) suppressing (‘number
of I1 is four or less per 10 000 per capita’), and (3) a decent duration
of the condition (criteria 1 and 2) that lasts for at least 40 days.
Figure 3A shows the results of a representative simulation
without a replacement (example 1: w = 0.3, ‘non-seasonality
model’) and with a replacement (example 2: w = 0.3, ‘non-
seasonality model’). The frequency of replacements was calculated
in 2000 simulations. The simulations found that the frequencies of
replacements in the ‘non-seasonality model’ were signiﬁcantly
higher than those in the ‘seasonality model’ (Figure 3B). Further-
more, the frequency increased with a decrease in intensity of cross-
immunity between the two strains (w). The frequency of
replacement reached 0.03 in the ‘seasonality model’ and 0.13 in
the ‘non-seasonality model’. Replacement hardly occurs (frequen-
cy is less than 0.01) when cross-immunity is high (i.e., large w). If an
emerged strain has a high cross-immunity, which means that there
is not much of an antigenic difference between existing and
emerged strains, an emerged strain cannot replace an existing one
because the emerged strain has no advantage.
While replacement of the emerged strain occurred soon after its
emergence in some simulations (Figure 3A, example 2), there was a
long time lag between emergence and replacement in other
simulations (example 3). It was then checked whether the time lag
for replacement was different between the ‘seasonality model’ and
‘non-seasonality model’. As shown in Figure 3C, there was no
signiﬁcant difference in the time lag from emergence to replace-
ment between the ‘seasonality’ and ‘non-seasonality’ models.
3.3. Possible factors and conditions affecting replacement
Next, whether any speciﬁc conditions can increase the
frequency of replacement in addition to low cross-immunity0 100 200 300 400 500
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Figure 3. Replacement by the emerged strain in the epidemic model. (A) Epidemic cur
Example 4: w = 1.0, ‘seasonality model’. (B) The frequency of replacement was calculate
seasonality model’. Error bars show 95% conﬁdence intervals. (C) Time lag between the em
model’ in simulations in which replacement happened. Error bars show standard deviatio
Student t-test for (C). ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, n.s., not signiﬁcant (p > 0.05).was explored. As the emerged strain (strain 2) appears at random
in the simulations, it was checked whether the epidemic
characteristics of the existing strain (strain 1) at the advent of
the emerged strain would affect the occurrence of replacement
(Figure 4). The ‘number of I1’ represents the magnitude of the
ongoing epidemic by the existing strain, and ‘number of R1’ reﬂects
herd immunity against the existing strain. In the ‘seasonality
model’ with high cross-immunity, both I1 and R1 at the emergence
of strain 2 were signiﬁcantly smaller in simulations in which
replacement occurred compared with simulations without re-
placement. Besides, the time lag between emergence and
replacement of strain 2 in such a situation (large w in the
‘seasonality model’) was short (Figure 3C). Taken together, these
ﬁndings imply that replacement takes place only when an emerged
strain appears at the initial stage of an epidemic and has become
predominant (Figure 3A; example 4: w = 1.0, ‘seasonality model’).
Furthermore, an analysis of timing when the emerged strain
appears also proves that replacement is more likely to occur when
the emerged strain appears before the peak of R0 in the ‘seasonality
model’ (Figure 1B and Figure 4C). However, in this situation where
cross-immunity was high (w > 0.6) with ‘seasonality’, replacement
was fairly rare (frequency of approximately 0.005; Figure 3B).
The numbers of I1 and R1 at the appearance of the emerged
strain are not so different between simulations with and without
replacement in the ‘non-seasonality model’ (Figure 4A and
Figure 4B). Further, the frequency of replacement does not differ
at any stage of the epidemic when the emerged strain appears
(Figure 4C). The timing of appearance of the emerged strain is not
that important for replacement in the ‘non-seasonality model’.
Yet, an exception was found in which the number of R1 in
simulations with replacement was slightly but signiﬁcantly higher
than simulations without replacement when w is 0.3 (Figure 4B). If
herd immunity (number of R1) does affect the frequency of
replacement, vaccination might be able to increase the probability
of replacement. Therefore, vaccination was introduced into the
simulation. Vaccine efﬁciency (VE) to prevent infection with0 100 200 300 400 500
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Figure 4. Situation of epidemic timing and strain emergence. Numbers of I1 (A) and R1 (B) when the strain emerged in simulations in which replacement did and did not take
place. Error bars show standard deviations of 2000 simulations. (C) Frequency of replacement by month group in which the emerged strain appeared, as described in
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Vaccination has both direct effects (reduction of individual
susceptibility) and indirect effects (herd immunity). VE was set
to decrease infection by 50% at the population level with a
vaccination coverage of 100% (Figure 5A; Supplementary Materi-
al). As a result, the introduction of vaccination did not change the
frequency of replacement, except for conditions where w was
0.4 and 0.7 in the ‘non-seasonality model’ (Figure 5B). Even under
exceptional conditions, the effects of vaccination in augmenting
the frequency of replacement were small.
3.4. Replacement by pandemic inﬂuenza virus
Finally, an investigation was performed to determine how a
pandemic inﬂuenza virus with antigenic shift expels a seasonal
inﬂuenza virus. Replacement of a previously circulating seasonal
virus with a pandemic virus has been observed historically.5,6
Further, experimental and epidemiological studies have shown
that there is non-strain-speciﬁc viral interference following
inﬂuenza virus infection.35,36 Therefore, there must be an
interaction between seasonal and pandemic viruses.37 In the
model, it was assumed that there is a non-strain-speciﬁc (strain-
independent) immunity state (Rnsp), regulated by innate immunity
such as interferon, soon after recovery. The Rnsp is followed by a
strain-speciﬁc (antibody-mediated) immunity state (Rspe; see
Methods and Figure 1A). Different parameters were used for
simulations in the pandemic model from the seasonal inﬂuenza
model: namely, no cross-immunity between existing and emerged
strains (w was 0), a high initial susceptibility (0.7–1.0 for ppst), a
high R0 (1.0–1.5 times higher R0 than the seasonal virus), and a
strong immune response (long period of non-strain-speciﬁcimmunity, 7–28 days) for the emerged strain with antigenic shift
(strain 2, pandemic virus; see Supplementary Material).
The frequency of replacement by the pandemic virus ranged
between 0.02 and 0.63 (Figure 6). It should be noted that these
frequencies were calculated by a single introduction of the
emerged strain. Multiple introductions from other areas could
occur after a widespread pandemic outbreak. If the probability of
replacement is 0.4 by a single introduction, it increases to 0.92 by
ﬁve introductions and to 0.99 by 10 introductions. The frequencies
were higher in the ‘non-seasonality model’ compared to the
‘seasonality model’, which were the same as simulations for the
seasonal inﬂuenza model (Figure 3B and Figure 6).
Even when R0 of the pandemic virus does not differ from that of
the seasonal inﬂuenza virus, low pre-immunity (i.e., high initial
susceptibility) is enough to dramatically increase the frequency of
replacement (Figure 6). When assuming that pre-immunity for a
pandemic virus was 0.3, which is as high as the seasonal inﬂuenza
virus (i.e., initial susceptibility, ppst, is as low as 0.7), a higher R0 of a
pandemic virus also leads to a higher frequency of replacement. It
has been reported that the immune response to a pandemic virus is
somehow different from that to a seasonal inﬂuenza virus.38–41 A
strong immune response (long period of non-strain-speciﬁc
immunity) to a pandemic virus increases the frequency of
replacement. However, it contributes only marginally to the
frequency of replacement compared to the effects of low pre-
immunity or high R0 of the pandemic virus (Figure 6).
4. Discussion
In the present study, the possible mechanisms of replacement
of a previously circulating strain of the inﬂuenza A virus by an
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Figure 5. Vaccination and replacement. (A) Infection rate of the epidemic with a single strain and various levels of vaccination coverage, calculated by 50 simulations.
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Figure 6. Replacement by the emerged strain in the pandemic model. Frequency of replacement calculated by 500 simulations for each parameter setting. Pre-immunity
(1  ppst), R0, and non-strain-speciﬁc immunity period of the pandemic virus are the parameter variables. Error bars show 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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inﬂuenza by simulation modelling. A recent study by Bedford et al.
showed the global dynamics of the inﬂuenza virus by analysing
how the virus can be disseminated among different countries (i.e.,
among populations).26 On the other hand, the present study
investigated the local dynamics of the virus within a population.
The virus causing a seasonal epidemic in temperate regions is
probably imported from the tropics where year-round circulation
of the virus is ongoing.16–18,23 In addition to the signiﬁcance of the
tropical region as a virus reservoir during an inter-epidemic period
in the temperate region, this study found that the tropical region
could play an important role as a place for replacement.
Even if a new strain emerges in the temperate region, it might be
difﬁcult to detect the emerged strain because of a low level of
circulation. Usually only a small fraction of circulating strains can be
detected and characterized in inﬂuenza surveillance. Yet, once such
an emerged strain appears in the tropical region or appears in the
temperate region and is then imported into the tropical region, the
strain is more likely to be detected because of a high probability of
replacement in the tropical region. Interestingly, the present
ﬁndings suggest that timing (stage of epidemic and herd immunity
for the existing strain) barely affects replacement in the tropical
region (Figure 4). While a new antigenic variant is thought to have
emerged in Southeast Asia and then spread to other parts of the
world,16–18 this is still controversial.42 This study proposes another
possibility – that such an antigenic variant can emerge anywhere
worldwide. Once such a virus is introduced into the tropical region,
it can become dominant by replacement, since replacement is more
likely to occur where there is no or little seasonality of inﬂuenza.
This could be why new antigenic variants tend to be found ﬁrst in
Southeast Asia.16,17 Furthermore, there are a few reports on the shift
of antigenic variants during one epidemic season,43 although the
majority of such a shift was observed in two inﬂuenza seasons in the
temperate region.44,45 That can also be explained by replacement
(shift of antigenic variants) in the tropical regions. The infection rate
in the tropical regions, which is constant and adequate but lower
than that in the high season of temperate regions, is responsible for
a high chance of replacement there in the model presented herein. It
is still not known whether the epidemiological characteristics there
are only the result of climate factors or a combination of climate and
environmental factors such as poor hygiene and infection control in
developing countries in the tropical regions.20,46
The pandemic inﬂuenza virus had a much higher frequency of
replacement compared to the seasonal inﬂuenza virus in the
present simulations (Figure 3B and Figure 6). In addition, the
frequency of replacement was higher in the ‘non-seasonality
model’ than in the ‘seasonality model’. Southeast Asia can be a
source of novel inﬂuenza A virus strains with a pandemic potential
because of close interactions between poultry, swine, and humans,
with a high human population density.47 Not only is there a high
probability of the advent of a novel inﬂuenza A virus from different
host species in such a situation, but there is also a high probability
of replacement by the emerged virus in an area at high risk of a
pandemic. Historically, most pandemic viruses have expelled
former seasonal viruses; the former seasonal viruses disappeared
after the emergence of a pandemic virus.5,6 Mechanisms for their
replacement by a pandemic virus have barely been discussed and
remain largely unknown. The present ﬁndings along with those
reported in a recent paper by Asaduzzaman et al. using a different
model, suggest that either or both a high initial susceptibility and
high R0 of a pandemic virus is required to cause the replacement.
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The H1N1 virus that re-emerged in 1977 (Russian ﬂu) was
genetically and antigenically close to H1N1 viruses isolated in the
1950s.48 There must have been substantial herd immunity against
the virus among those in the population aged over 25 years,49,50
resulting in the co-circulation of two viruses without replacement.Similarly, the H3N2 virus did not disappear after the emergence of
the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, although the antigenically closer H1N1
virus – a descendant of the Russian ﬂu virus – disappeared.12,13 It
has been reported that pre-immunity against the pandemic virus
A(H1N1)pdm09 existed in the population, particularly in the
elderly.10,11 An epidemiological study showed that the initial
susceptibility of the pandemic virus was just a little greater than
the seasonal virus (75–76% vs. 64–71%).31 Besides, the same study
indicated that the estimated R0 of the pandemic was as low as
seasonal inﬂuenza.31 These characteristics of the 2009 pandemic
might be the reasons for no replacement of the H3N2 virus.
There are a couple of limitations to the present study. Firstly, age-
speciﬁc parameters were not used in the model, in order to make the
model simple. The contact rate, infection rate, and immunity must
be different among age groups.51,52 The individual-based stochastic
model set different infection rates and immunity for each person.
This could have reproduced heterogeneous populations to some
extent. Still, the homogeneous mixing population in the model
cannot reproduce age-speciﬁc social contacts and mixing patterns.53
Secondly, epidemiological parameters used in the model were
acquired from studies of different populations in different time
periods (Supplementary Material). Since few epidemiological
studies have focused on epidemiological characteristics of antigenic
variants of inﬂuenza A virus, it was not possible to ﬁt parameters in
the model to observed data. It was simply assumed that those
parameters are stationary in different populations over time.
The present study reports new aspects on the ecology of the
inﬂuenza A virus. Replacement of an existing strain by an emerged
strain takes place through the composite effects of viral evolution
(antigenic change), host immunity, infectivity (R0), and seasonali-
ty, although these factors are all intricately linked. Today, seasonal
inﬂuenza vaccine strains are updated every few years to match the
strains circulating in the coming season. Since replacement by a
new antigenic variant is likely to take place in the tropical region, it
is necessary to strengthen surveillance there in order to detect
antigenic variants in a timely manner.54 Such an effort could avoid
a mismatch between circulating and vaccine strains.55,56 Also,
knowing whether a pandemic virus has replaced a former
(seasonal) virus would be useful when considering which subtypes
of the virus should be included in the vaccine. A universal vaccine
that is effective for any subtypes of the inﬂuenza A virus by
targeting the stalk region of hemagglutinin (HA) or conserved
proteins like M2 is under development.57,58 This study could also
be a springboard for discussions on how such universal vaccines
would affect the ecological dynamics of the viruses, including the
replacement of strains.
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